Terrorism on September 11, 2001 Essay Example for Free

Terrorism on September 11, 2001 Essay Terrorism is no vague concept but a modern danger and growing concern throughout the world. With the peak of violence seen on September 11, 2001 and the subsequent attacks experienced throughout the world following that attack, the United States awareness and reaction to terrorism and terrorist acts has changed. In an ideological war with no end in sight the way in which America fights the war on terror will help determine the eventual outcome. In his report, Unconquerable Nation, terrorism analyst Brian Michael Jenkins attempts to provide background and a deeper understanding of the threat faced by the United States in the coming years from al Qaeda and similar groups. This information teamed with advice and analysis gleaned from decades of terrorism research, lay out a plan for combating terrorism through deeper means and deeper understanding of the enemy. As Jenkins explains is his introductory chapter, a five-point philosophy of war must be employed not only by the government in the war on terror but also supported and carried by the average citizen. The five points are a necessity of knowing the enemy, mobilization of individual courage and commitment to the necessary good, psychological strength, an understanding and commitment to the longevity of the mission, and embracing â€Å"liberty as the source and sustenance of security† (2006, p. 5). Among some of the flaws in the current campaign is the failure to perform many of these points, chief among them is a lack of understanding of the enemy and the reality of the time necessary to defeat such a foe. Brian Michael Jenkins has been part of terrorism research and strategy from the beginning, when in 1972 the U. S. first began to take a look at terrorism as a distinct and increasingly dangerous risk (p. 6). As he notes, the Lod Airport massacre in Israel and the murder of Olympic athletes in Munich in 1972 led to the creation of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (p. 7). However, terrorism has continued to evolve over the past several decades as the terrorist ideology has shifted from a strictly political standpoint into the arena of religious (p. 8). Conventionally defined as â€Å"a small, artificially defined segment of political violence† (Jenkins, 2006, p. 8), it has grown to be most visible in recent years as a mix of skewed religious ideologies and political unrest viewed through centuries of historical and theological unrest. In the 1980s the threat from terrorism grew outside the arena of simply a political vehicle. Where once terrorist acts were committed to gain visibility and understanding of the group and their demands, the attacks had now become more bloody and indiscriminate as the terrorists are not interested in image. Jenkins explains that, â€Å"today, many terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead† (2006, p. 9). With the increase of senseless, casualty-heavy violence fears over what methods they will employ have increased. In the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union a general sense of fear began to permeate among international and political analysts (p. 146). The United States and other western countries began preparing for the worst, as predictions were made on nuclear proliferation, the diversion of the Soviet Union’s heavy arsenal to terrorist groups and unsympathetic countries (p. 147-148). However, none of these fears has yet come to tangible proof. While on 9/11, terrorists were able to deal the largest blow to the United States through conventional terrorist methods of attack, their bombs were neither nuclear or biological; their infiltration into society and subsequent hijacking were done using conventional means and bombs (p. 149). Primary among, Jenkins points is the understanding of al Qaeda and related jihadist groups in waging a successful campaign against terrorism. Terrorists today aren’t the same as traditional guerilla militias or the terrorists of the 1970s. â€Å"The enemies we face have changed fundamentally† (Jenkins, 2006, p. 14). Though the current U. S. led efforts to subdue and eradicate al Qaeda and related groups have been successful in driving them underground, they have not addressed the root of the terrorist discourse or stemmed recruitment or what Jenkins calls the political war (p. 14). In ignoring the current implications and ideology of al Qaeda and like-minded terrorists the U. S. is counteracting its own progress. The concept of jihad, the driving force behind al Qaeda, has been elevated, â€Å"from a struggle within one’s soul to an unlimited war against the West† (p. 23). Their grievances with the West, as espoused by Osama bin Laden and his brothers in arms, are both valid and unattainable. One of the root causes noted by bin Laden and his followers include the treatment of Palestine by Israel which the U. S. is seen as supporting through their support of Israel. This could and, according to Jenkins, should be addressed as it is a â€Å"noble† cause (p. 125). However, many of their grievances such as the presence of the U. S. in the Middle-East, Saudi Arabia, a saturation of Western culture as a destructive factor in Islam are unattainable goals. Jenkins implies and I agree, that the demands are unattainable by design and therefore supportive of a never-ending jihad. Those who believed that the war on terrorism would begin and end with the war in Iraq were only half right. While of strategic and ideological importance, Iraq has been both an overly dominant and distracting force in the overall war on terrorism. I agree with Jenkins assessment that the conflict will only reach another stage with the withdrawal from Iraq and whether viewed with defeat or victory the withdrawal will usher in a new stage in an ongoing conflict. I agree wholeheartedly with Jenkins assessment that, â€Å"we are still closer to the beginning then the end of what is likely to be a very long campaign† (p/ 176). In fighting a political war against al Qaeda and other jihadists, the U. S. would be most effective in trying to stem recruitment, prevent the spreading of their ideology by promoting alternatives and education on religion (p. 125). By using measures to halt recruitment and reeducate detainees, the U. S. would see more long term results. Many of the tactics used so far like the fall of the Taliban and closing of training camps in Afghanistan, thwarted attacks, and disrupted funding (pp. 27-29), while important do not dispel the group’s danger. As Jenkins explains, they have adapted to the new limitations and not knowing the actual size of the enemy it is difficult to assess the true danger and actual gains (p. 27). The jihadist’s real weapon against the U. S. is ideological, â€Å"Armed forces alone cannot win this war. The real battle is ideological† (Jenkins, 2006, p. 120). A loss of capital hasn’t prevented attacks since 9/11 or halted recruitment. In the environment created by the U. S. ’s continued presence in Iraq, the jihadists have attempted to seize an opportunity to use discontent to build their numbers. The U. S. has to fight this as well. The U. S. and other countries fighting the war on terrorism have to discredit al Qaeda’s message and to use their extremism against them. Jihadists’ beliefs are the minority, â€Å"to many Muslims, even those angered by U. S. policies, bin Laden is a crackpot† (p. 107). Still to some he speaks the truth and even changing the way in which believers are handled would be effective in the long run in defeating the threat. By trying to change the thinking and treatment of detainees, the U. S. and other governments can prevent future acts of terrorism. By working with willing defectors and possible converts, the U. S. could stem their flow of willing bodies, which is their greatest weapon, as Jenkins explains and I agree, â€Å"political warfare accepts no for as having irrevocably crossed a line† (p. 122). If the U. S. government and it’s allies write off the discontent of the recruitment population they run the risk of alienating a whole new generation of terrorist fighters. Jihad’s strongest weapon is its connection to the people; recruiters are able to recognize and weed out the committed and able to manipulate religious belief. Islam is used as a unifying factor by these terrorist groups, they see unity in the Muslim world as an outcome of jihad (p. 107). Increased modes of communication such as the internet and intense organization have allowed for a broader reach in the jihadist message. Their leaders are in for the long haul, â€Å"al Qaeda will not quit its leaders have no alternatives† (p. 38). By fighting the root causes of the movement and creating disillusionment and doubt in its followers, though more time intensive, the West will create a better future. As long as jihadist ideology is treated as outside the realm of reasonable understanding, it will not be defeated. As Jenkins pointedly explains, â€Å"their mindsets and their concepts of fighting are foreign to us, but they make sense in the context of their beliefs and circumstances† (p. 60). Through understanding, the war on terrorism will have its greatest victories. It can’t be treated or viewed like a conventional war, the enemy is not another country or a distinct leader but a mindset bred from circumstance and perverted ideals. So, first and foremost we must battle against the mindset. Countries like Yemen, Singapore, and Saudi Arabia have had success with religious counseling and debate with detainees (p. 130-131). Why doesn’t the U. S. do the same? Instead their have been indeterminate detainments, isolation, and endless interrogation (p. 132). Torture as a means of interrogation, something thought to be beneath American values has been not only practiced by defended. This is not the way to show and maintain our values in the face of a belief based insurgency. We have to learn from other countries examples and Jenkins proposes acceptance of even our imperfect allies, particularly Russia and Pakistan (p. 134). I agree with Jenkins in his assessment of realizing and accepting the risks and realities of this type of campaign is paramount in a publicly advocated and successful war (p. 153). War does not come without risk or with guaranteed successes, there will be discouragements as not every attack can be foreseen and prevented but conscientious persistence is a must. References Jenkins, B. M. (2006). Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemies, Strengthening Ourselves. RAND Corporation.